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Being Perceived and Being “Seen”: 
Interpersonal Affordances,  
Agency, and Selfhood
Nick Brancazio*
School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities, University of Wollongong, 
Wollongong, NSW, Australia
Are interpersonal affordances a distinct type of affordance, and if so, what is it that 
differentiates them from other kinds of affordances? In this paper, I show that a hard 
distinction between interpersonal affordances and other affordances is warranted and 
ethically important. The enactivist theory of participatory sense-making demonstrates that 
there is a difference in coupling between agent-environment and agent-agent interactions, 
and these differences in coupling provide a basis for distinguishing between the perception 
of environmental and interpersonal affordances. Building further on this foundation for 
understanding interpersonal affordances, I argue that in line with some enactivist work 
on social cognition, interpersonal affordances ought to be considered as those that are 
afforded by agents and are recognized as such. Given this distinction, I also make the 
point that because our social conventions establish persons as more than mere agents, 
the direct perception of interpersonal affordances may also involve seeing others as 
embodied selves. Distinguishing between types of affordances thus also matters ethically: 
there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as an agent, and there can 
be harms done when an agent is not perceived as a self.
Keywords: social affordances, interpersonal affordances, direct perception, social cognition, agency, selfhood
INTRODUCTION
Are ecological psychology and enactivism committed to a difference between our perception 
of the environment and our perception of other agents? Drawing from James Gibson’s work 
(J. Gibson, 1979/2015) on perception, contemporary enactivism and ecological psychology both 
use the theory of affordances or perceived possibilities for interaction. Affordances are neither 
properties of the environment nor the agent, but are co-constituted in the agent-environment 
relationship, given the agent’s values, abilities (Chemero, 2003), and skills (van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017) 
as the agent actively explores her world (J. Gibson, 1979/2015). Ecological psychology is largely 
built around the notion of affordances as the main objects of perception, while in enactivism 
affordances have played a more subsidiary and contentious role.
Increasingly, enactivists are using the language of affordances in their explanatory frameworks 
(see, e.g., Gallagher, 2008, 2017; Di Paolo et  al., 2017). Enactivism and ecological psychology 
share a number of theoretical commitments, and many see them as kindred approaches to 
cognition. Both reject the received view of cognition as internal, computational, and representational. 
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Both propose that we  see cognition as an active process 
constituted in the relationship between organism and 
environment. Both argue that perception is intersubjectively 
developed (Gallagher, 2008; De Jaegher et  al., 2016), learned 
(E. Gibson, 1963), and/or socially mediated (Heft, 2007). These 
should be  thought of as broad agreements in spirit, though, 
rather than precise overlaps – the approaches are sisters, 
not twins.
Given that the ecological approach relies on James Gibson’s 
theory of direct perception (J. Gibson, 1972/2002), we  should 
understand affordances not as inferred through our perception 
of the environment, but as directly perceived. We  see an apple 
as edible, rather than post-perceptually inferring that it is edible 
(for example, Nanay, 2011). Further, while apples can offer 
the possibility of sustenance or afford being eaten, this might 
only be perceived as a relevant affordance if an agent is actively 
searching for something to eat; if I were looking for something 
to hold down a paper that was in danger of blowing away, 
an apple might instead afford the possibility of serving that 
purpose for me.
The social contributions to affordance perception have been 
widely discussed and debated in the ecological psychology 
literature (e.g., Reed, 1991; Costall, 1995, 2012; Heft, 2007). 
Other people, though, are not apples, and how we  perceive 
the affordances offered by other agents is a much smaller 
subset of this literature. The contemporary hybrid theory of 
ecological-enactivism has offered some headway on how 
we might approach uniquely social affordances (Rietveld, 2008; 
Rietveld et  al., 2017), holding that social affordances offer 
possibilities for social interaction. However, ecological-enactivists 
have also maintained that there is an equivalence between our 
perception of environmental affordances and social affordances 
(Rietveld et  al., 2013, 2017). This work on social affordances 
has been valuable for explaining how we  might both 
pre-reflectively experience and conscientiously shape our 
interactive spaces.
Here, though, I propose that in bringing together ecological 
and enactivist views on social interactions, we need to maintain 
a finer-grained distinction between environmental affordances 
that offer opportunities for socializing, such as public spaces, 
and those offered by agents themselves. That is, I  will argue 
that the perception of interpersonal affordances (Trierweiler 
and Donovan, 1994; Richardson et  al., 2007; Fiebich, 2014), 
defined as opportunities afforded by other agents, is indeed 
different from the perception of environmental affordances, 
given what enactivism has provided on the unique nature of 
agent-agent coupling.
Given the role that intersubjectivity plays in the enactive 
framework, and the importance of joint sense-making in 
interaction (De Jaegher, 2013a,b), distinguishing between 
affordances in agent-environment and agent-agent relationships 
ought to be  taken as both explanatorily and ethically relevant 
due to the differences in cognitive activities and types of 
coupling. Put simply, the perception of interpersonal affordances 
is uniquely interactive. While this is a foundational point 
for enactivist accounts of social cognition (Gallagher, 2008; 
De Jaegher, 2009), I  argue here that this ought to be  equally 
applicable when accounting for the perception of affordances 
offered by other agents.
Importantly, this distinction is also ethically relevant. For 
human forms of life, the mutual attribution of agency that 
happens in social interactions involves many layers. One of 
these, I  argue, is that we  perceive other humans as selves. 
Selves are scaffolded by social convention and practice and 
are developed in relation with others (Kyselo, 2014). Here, 
using Maiese’s “life-shaping” thesis of selfhood (Maiese, 2019), 
I  show the importance of perceiving both agency and selfhood 
in interactions and, conversely, demonstrate the harm that can 
be  done by refusing to recognize another as an agent or as 
a self. This advances the discussion on the ethical dimensions 
of affordances in interaction and helps illustrate the damage 
that is done when one is perceived as affording possibilities 
for interaction that deny their agency or aspects of their selfhood.
SOCIAL AFFORDANCES AND 
INTERPERSONAL AFFORDANCES
The social aspects of affordances have been detailed in ecological 
psychology by those such as Heft (2007), who argues that the 
perception of affordances is in all ways social. That is, Heft 
argues that both the ontogeny and phylogeny of how we  come 
to perceive affordances, for humans, is socially developed 
through niche construction and the influence of culture through 
the constructed ecological niche (see also: McGann, 2014 on 
intersubjectivity, E. Gibson, 1963 on perceptual learning, and 
Ramstead et al., 2016 on cultural affordances)1. The intersubjective 
development of affordance perception applies to both 
environmental affordances and the account of interpersonal 
affordances that I  will offer here.
As Rietveld et al. (2017, p. 300) define them, social affordances 
are “possibilities for social interaction or sociability provided 
by the environment.” They have been defined elsewhere even 
more broadly:
“Social and communicative affordances that reflect the 
meaning of human activity for other humans  
(cf. McArthur and Baron, 1983; Reed, 1988). These 
include not only the affordances of symbolic behavior 
such as human conversation and writing (Dent, in press) 
but also the affordances of nonsymbolic activity such as 
facial expressions (Alley, 1988; Buck, 1988), gesture 
(Tomasello, 1988; Van Acker and Valenti, 1989), body 
postures and movements (Runeson and Frykholm, 
1983), tone of voice (Walker, 1982; Walker-Andrews, 
1986), and the direction of gaze (orienting; Scaife and 
Bruner, 1975; Butterworth and Cochran, 1980) that 
provide information about the actor as well as about 
1 Eleanor Gibson is often overlooked and under-cited, and oftentimes a citation 
to “Gibson” is assumed to be  a reference to another well-known Gibson. 
Following the convention introduced by Miguel Segundo-Ortin, I  cite Eleanor 
Gibson as “E. Gibson” and James Gibson as “J. Gibson” to bring more attention 
to her unique contributions.
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other aspects of the environment. The symbolic 
behaviors (language) are entirely conventional and 
culture-specific, whereas the nonsymbolic are only 
partly so” (Loveland, 1991, p. 101).
Loveland’s conception incorporates a list of affordances that 
might be  related to acts of socializing or communication. 
Loveland’s list is meant to be  more limited than, for example, 
saying that affordances can be canonical, a term used by Costall 
(2012) to refer to the way that affordances can be  specific to 
socio-cultural practices. That is, Costall uses this term to point 
out that some affordances are available only because those 
perceiving them have learned certain ways of engaging with 
the environment or certain meanings of items through social 
means. An example of this is a recycling bin. This only affords 
the recycling of an item if one has been raised in a social 
environment where recycling is a norm or somehow otherwise 
knows about the social convention of recycling.
Gallagher and Ransom (2016) use the term “social affordances” 
in an even more limited sense in discussing the social affordances 
provided by social media. As many of our social interactions 
do not take place in person, that a certain website or app 
affords sociability could mean many things. For example, an 
app can be  used for facilitating meet-ups in the sense of one 
creating or responding to a social media event for an upcoming 
gathering or collective action. It could also mean facilitating 
direct exchange between agents in a virtual space, such as with 
a messaging app. This usage of the term is also becoming 
widespread in areas that study human-technology interaction 
and mediation, such as networking technology (e.g., Bradner, 2001) 
and social robotics (e.g., Paauwe et  al., 2015).
Social affordances have also been discussed in some detail 
by ecological-enactivists. The hybrid theory of ecological-
enactivism (Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014) has brought together 
both the ecological and enactive approaches in their proposal 
of the Skilled Intentionality Framework (SIF; van Dijk and 
Rietveld, 2017). The SIF incorporates the “lived perspective of 
a skilled individual” as integral for understanding how it is 
that we  perceive relevant affordances (van Dijk and Rietveld, 
2017, p.  3). The development of the skills for being attuned 
to relevant affordances for the agent can be  thought of as 
“multiple bodily states of action readinesss reciprocally coupled 
to the landscape of affordances, in the sense that these states 
of action readiness self-organize and shape the selective openness 
to the landscape of affordances” (van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017, 
p. 8). Though we might think of skill in the sense of expertise, 
this includes any embodied or pre-reflexive skills or capacities 
for navigating the world. Skilled intentionality can be as simple 
as selectively perceiving a mug handle as graspable when one 
is heading to the coffee pot for a refill. Through our skills 
and habits of coupling, we  are selectively open to the relevant 
affordances of the environment for the task(s) we are undertaking.
In their discussion of social affordances, Rietveld et al. (2017) 
offer a number of concrete suggestions for improving sociability 
in the sense of providing spaces where people from disparate 
backgrounds or with very different interests might be  inclined 
to come together. Their suggestions include park planning and 
other architectural interventions to offer options for activities 
conducive to social interactions in public spaces. In this sense, 
sociability could also be  afforded anywhere that people tend 
to have social interactions, such as coffee shops, parks, the 
grocery store check-out lane, or even the sidewalk, though all 
of this would be  heavily dependent on sociocultural norms 
and practices.
Because sociability and social interactions are quite different, 
it is important to distinguish these further. Affording sociability 
might apply to an area or an artifact (such as an app), in 
that it can lead to a social interaction, but these affordances 
themselves are not socially interactive in an interpersonal 
sense. A sociability affordance might be  one that affords an 
interaction conducive space or can facilitate or lead to an 
interaction. These might often be  a pre-cursor to a social 
interaction but are neither necessary nor sufficient to lead to 
an interaction. More specific claims about what is afforded 
by certain types of social affordances, or when sociability is 
afforded, should be  made cautiously though. What one feels 
is an “interaction conducive space” would of course 
be  dependent on culture, social position, and identity. There 
may be  gender, race, neurodiversity, disability-related, or 
historical issues or dynamics that would influence whether 
spaces are perceived as hostile, dangerous, or uncomfortable 
for some and welcoming or comfortable for others 
(De Jaegher, 2013a,b; Heras-Escribano, 2019, Ch. 7; Jurgens, 2020).
It should also be  stressed that, in the terms of the social 
cognition literature, interpersonal affordances should not be taken 
to imply a Theory of Mind, which is an inference about or 
simulation of the mental state of the other. A Theory of Mind 
is built on the idea that we  are at a remove from the mental 
state of the other in social interactions, and that we  use 
simulation (implicit mental simulation, e.g., Goldman and 
Sripada, 2005, or mirror neuron systems, e.g., Gallese, 2005) 
or inference (e.g., some kind of implicit or explicit theory 
about others’ minds, e.g., Gopnik and Wellman, 1992) to explain 
how we  as spectators (Schilbach et  al., 2013) come to know 
the other’s mental state (their intentions, emotions, etc.). Rather, 
perceiving an interpersonal affordance should be  thought of 
as phenomenologically immediate, as with James Gibson’s theory 
of the direct perception of affordances (J. Gibson, 1979/2015).
Direct perception is the basis of interaction theory, the 
theory of social cognition proposed by Gallagher (2008). It 
might be helpful to draw a similarity between Gallagher’s direct 
perception theory and how we ought to understand interpersonal 
affordances. This enactivist conception of direct perception is 
built on the idea that cognition is fundamentally embodied 
and action-oriented. As such, it is not the case that mental 
states are locked away inside the mind of the other. In direct 
perception, we  simply see affective states and goal-oriented 
actions as such, with no need for inference. Having moved 
away from the input-model of perception, there is no need 
for an inference or for simulation in order to see a motion 
of a hand toward a cup as reaching for the cup. Likewise, 
we  see a friend as excited without need for inference or 
attribution (Varga, 2018). Reflexively, we  might make this 
attribution, but in most cases this is because that is how 
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we  perceived the action. And while we  might sometimes use 
an inferential process to try to figure out what someone is 
doing or feeling, this is when something is complex or confusing. 
It is the exception, not the rule.
Interaction theory incorporates affordance perception into the 
explanation of how it is that we  directly perceive these mental 
states. This is explained by Gallagher and Varga (2014, p.  189):
“According to [interaction theory] and the direct 
perception hypothesis, social perception is enactive. 
That is, my perception of your action is already formed 
in terms of how I might respond to your action. I see 
your action, not as a fact that needs to be interpreted in 
terms of your mental states, but as a situated opportunity 
or affordance for my own action in response. The 
intentions that I can see in your movements appear to 
me as logically or semantically continuous with my own, 
or discontinuous, in support or in opposition to my task, 
as encouraging or discouraging, as having potential for 
(further) interaction or as something I want to turn and 
walk away from.”
While this is an excellent example of a fruitful integration 
of affordances with enactive approaches to social perception, 
interaction theory has been criticized for not being interactive 
enough (De Jaegher, 2009). In the following section, I  will 
turn to the theory of participatory sense-making (De Jaegher 
and Di Paolo, 2007) to provide a more detailed argument, 
based in interaction, for holding that the perception of 
interpersonal affordances is different from the perception of 
environmental (and social or sociability) affordances due to 
differences in coupling.
ENACTIVE AUTONOMY AND 
INTERACTION
Interpersonal affordances offer opportunities for interaction 
with another agent and, therefore differ in definition from 
environmental or sociability affordances. The participatory 
sense-making framework, grounded in autopoietic enactivism, 
provides a further way of distinguishing interpersonal affordances 
from other types in terms of affording possibilities specific to 
a social interaction. That is, interpersonal affordances are offered 
in an autonomous interactive process that emerges in the 
coupling of agents.
The enactivist notion of autonomy is based on the most 
fundamental of organismic processes: self-maintenance and self-
production. These self-organizing processes form the foundation 
for the autopoietic approach to cognition (Maturana and Varela, 
1980). An organism must maintain itself and its boundaries 
through a network of biological processes while at the same 
time being selectively open to the world in order to take in 
from the environment what it needs to sustain its existence.
Summarizing Varela (1979), Thompson (2007, p. 44) describes 
the autopoietic view as holding that processes constituting the 
autonomous organization of a system: “(i) recursively depend 
on each other for their generation and their realization as a 
network, (ii) constitute the system as a unity in whatever 
domain they exist, and (iii) determine a domain of possible 
interactions with the environment.” The autonomous system 
thus creates the conditions of its own persistence, and the 
capacities of the system establish the ways in which it can 
interact with the world.
Maintaining these processes requires that the system be open 
to the world in ways that enable the system to continue 
these maintenance processes. Being open to the world in 
ways that are appropriate for the organism is possible because, 
in addition to having the capacities to act, organisms are 
able to make sense of the world in some way. Sense-making 
(Varela et  al., 1991) involves an organism actively exploring 
a world through the perception of what might be  helpful 
for maintaining organismic integrity and what can hinder or 
harm, and acting accordingly. Or, more concisely, it is “the 
creation and appreciation of meaning in interaction with the 
world” (De Jaegher, 2013b, p.  6).
In the autopoietic tradition of enactivism, an agent can 
be  defined as “an autonomous system capable of adaptively 
regulating its coupling with the environment according to the 
norms established by its own viability conditions” (Di Paolo 
et  al., 2017, p.  127). This is not to say that agency itself is 
attributable to the organism, as enactivism holds that cognition 
is a relational process rather than involving the internal processing 
of environmental information. On the enactive account, “perhaps 
agency is not a property that belongs exclusively to a system 
but is a property of a relation between that system and its 
surroundings. And this relation is variable” (Di Paolo et  al., 
2017, p.  110). Thus while we  might call an organism an agent, 
agency itself would be  the relational process of selectively 
attuning one’s actions in accordance with the environment and 
others. The relational account of agency is variable, in that 
there is an interactional asymmetry between the organism and 
the environment, and the relationship fluctuates given the 
organism’s needs and perhaps environmental demands. There 
can be  a difference in the balance of agency in the agent-
environment relationship given the particulars of a current 
circumstance. For instance, the balance of agency in the agent-
environment relationship will be  different when I  am  looking 
in the fridge for a midnight snack versus when I  am  fleeing 
a park due to a sudden high-wind storm.
While these provide a picture of the most minimal processes 
of life and cognition, these notions scale up to more complex 
behaviors and systems of organization. For social organisms, 
the agential process of active attunement does not simply mean 
that the environment includes others but that others contribute 
to agential processes and interactions with others can be  their 
own autonomous processes. These interpersonal and social 
dynamics are captured in the theory of participatory 
sense-making, as introduced by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007). 
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p.  497) define participatory 
sense-making as “the coordination of intentional activity in 
interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are 
affected and new domains of social sense-making can 
be  generated that were not available to each individual on 
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her own.” The interaction is mutually co-constituted, co-regulated, 
and co-sustained by autonomous agents, who are recursively 
shaped within the interaction they are sustaining. In participatory 
sense-making, we  have the coupling of autonomous systems 
that, through that coupling, create an autonomous interaction 
that involves a precarious balance between participants in order 
to be  maintained.
Being able to be  involved in processes of mutual creation 
of social meaning is important to self-production and 
maintenance within the intersubjective sphere. It is through 
these kinds of interactions that the normativity of social practices 
in the social niche are created, shaped, and changed. For human 
forms of life, maintaining autonomy involves more than 
organismic processes of self-production and maintenance in 
a purely bodily sense. De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p.  493) 
give a brief description of the criteria for establishing that an 
interaction is social, based on this interactive notion of 
emergent autonomy:
“Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at 
least two autonomous agents, where the regulation is 
aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes 
an emergent autonomous organization in the domain 
of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process 
the autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter’s 
scope can be augmented or reduced).”
In participatory sense-making, preservation of the autonomy 
of the involved agents involves a mutual recognition of the 
subjecthood of the other. This recognition is meant in an 
immediate fashion – it is not that one decides the other is a 
subject, but that they are already seen as “a subject, not an 
object” (McGann and De Jaegher, 2009, p. 428; also see Schilbach 
et  al., 2013). To this, I  add that this similarly also involves 
the direct perception of the other as an agent. There is a 
direct perception of the agency and subjectivity of the other.
The interaction process can and does involve asymmetries 
of autonomy in order to maintain itself. Agency is recognized, 
while autonomy fluctuates. This is because the interaction 
process also involves ebbs and flows of mutual regulation (Di 
Paolo et  al., 2018). In an interaction, the regulating role of 
the processes of mutual sense-making should, ideally, flow back 
and forth between agents in order to co-constitute the interactive 
process. This will involve coordination in multiple dimensions. 
For instance, two people may be  engaged in a conversation 
at a coffee shop. There will be  bodily coordination in the 
sense that they pre-reflectively align their postures (Richardson 
et al., 2005), and they will perhaps be pre-reflectively balancing 
their emotional states in response to the other (Hatfield et  al., 
1993; Kiverstein, 2015). Both participants may pre-reflectively 
compromise in order to attune to the comportment of the 
other. One may follow the other in leaning forward when 
exchanging a particularly juicy bit of gossip or leaning back 
when talking about how busy their workweek has been. One 
may have a long story to share, and there may be an asymmetry 
in regulating the flow of utterances in the interaction – one 
person is regulating through their continued utterances, while 
the other is regulated as listener, offering a chuckle or gasp 
at the appropriate times. While the regulator and regulated 
roles flow back and forth, neither party’s autonomy is ever 
harmfully compromised in this idealized example. Both are 
perceived by the other as autonomous agents within the 
interaction, both are involved in establishing the norms of 
that interaction, and regulatory roles can be  seen as a matter 
of request, not force.
Now, consider that affordances are possibilities for action 
(or interaction). Rietveld et  al. (2013, 2017) want to avoid a 
hard distinction between the perception of social and 
environmental affordances by appealing to the similarities in 
how we  perceive them as embodied agents. Pointing to the 
Skilled Intentionality Framework, they note that the skill of 
picking out relevant affordances generates “readiness of the 
affordance-related ability” (Rietveld, 2008). Whether a relevant 
affordance is environmental or social, “starting from bodily 
or skilled intentionality, our perspective avoids an artificial 
separation between social cognition and nonsocial engagements 
with the environment” (Rietveld et  al., 2013).
This is unproblematic if we  are talking about the difference 
between environmental and social (in the sense of sociability) 
affordances. However, if we  are talking about interpersonal 
affordances, those afforded by or in interaction with others, 
the lack of distinction becomes an issue. First, interpersonal 
affordances are not given in the relationship between an agent 
and an environment but in the relationship between agents. 
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) argue that these are different 
types of coupling (see also De Jaegher, 2009). The divide 
between environmental affordances and interpersonal affordances 
is not artificial – in the first case, you  have a mere coupling, 
and in the latter case, there is a mutually regulated coupling:
“Thus, social interaction has two characteristics:  
(1) there is a coupling, which is regulated so as to 
generate and maintain an identity in the relational 
domain. Thus, the resulting relational dynamics are 
autonomous in the strict sense of precarious operational 
closure … and define events and processes as either 
internal or external to the interaction. And (2) the 
individuals involved are and remain autonomous as 
interactors” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 493).
The skill of being attuned to relevant affordances should 
also include a sensitivity to the possibility that one can engage 
in a social interaction. This would often involve directly perceiving 
one as an agent able to enter into an autonomous interaction, 
due to the intertwining of perceiving-as and action-readiness. 
Perception (on both ecological and enactive accounts) is an 
active process of looking for action possibilities in the 
environment, so the perception of interpersonal affordances 
will often involve specifically looking for affordances provided 
by an agent. It might be  relevant that one is a specific agent 
(when one has an appointment to meet with a friend), or it 
might be  relevant that one is an adult agent more generally 
(if I  am  on the street looking for someone to speak with so 
I can ask for directions), but nonetheless, I am actively perceiving 
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an agent, and the perception of agency is intertwined with 
my readiness to respond to a perceived interpersonal affordance.
There are many fairly innocuous reasons that an agent’s 
autonomy might be  compromised in an interaction: we  can 
imagine a caregiver giving a child a stern talking-to for 
misbehavior, for example.
There are also ways in which sociocultural position, norms, 
and power dynamics can limit the speech affordances available 
in some interactions or what a speaker affords to others with 
their words (Ayala, 2016). A member of a marginalized group, 
for example, may perceive opportunities to interact differently 
(or perceive less of them), might find that their words have 
less impact or that they solicit less attention in interaction 
with a member of a dominant social group. This could 
be  considered a compromise of autonomy and/or contributor 
to regulation role imbalance, in that it narrows the possibilities 
for engaging in collaborative sense-making. There also exist 
more extreme imbalances in autonomy, in the case that one 
is not treated as a subject and as an agent. These can constitute 
a grievous devaluation or dehumanization, such as occurs in 
torture or warfare, where one is treated as non-human (animalistic 
dehumanization) or as not possessing agency at all (mechanistic 
dehumanization; Haslam, 2006; Gallagher and Varga, 2014).
Failures to recognize a person as an agent are not only 
something that happens in these extreme cases though. This 
frequently happens more subtly in everyday interactions, when 
failing to recognize one’s agency by perceiving them as an 
object or tool. Further, there are other harms of recognition, 
such as failing to recognize another’s social selfhood in interaction. 
In the final section, I  will expand on the ways that neglecting 
or refusing to perceive one as a self can be  an ethical issue. 
First, though, in the following section, I  will describe Maiese’s 
enactive notion of selfhood (Maiese, 2019) so that we  can 
also look at the importance of perceiving a persisting self in 
human interactions.
ENACTIVE AND EMBODIED SELFHOOD
For human forms of life, agency alone is often not going to 
be  a robust enough notion to capture what it is we  might 
want recognized in social interactions. We  are also selves, 
persisting over time, with particular lived experiences, identities, 
and ways of being in the world. How it is that we  can say 
a “self ” exists, is individuated, and persists over time though 
is a matter of much contention. The enactive account provides 
a multi-dimensional and nuanced approach to agency – there 
are several domains of agency that enable and constrain each 
other through their overlap of processes and sensorimotor 
schemes, such as organismic agency (discussed in section 
“Enactive Autonomy and Interaction”), sensorimotor agency 
(Di Paolo et  al., 2017), and linguistic agency (Cuffari et  al., 
2015; Di Paolo et  al., 2018). The complexity of these latter 
kinds of agency, their intersubjective development, and their 
ubiquity in our social niche enables the formation of what 
Kyselo (2014) has called the socially individuated self. Building 
on the strengths of Kyselo’s work, Maiese (2019) has proposed 
a life-shaping thesis of selfhood, grounded in autopoietic 
enactivism, which like enactive accounts of agency is nuanced 
and multi-dimensional. I  will use the life-shaping thesis here 
for demonstrating the importance of selfhood in human 
interactions, in perceiving interpersonal affordances and 
understanding the ethical aspects of recognizing each other 
as more than mere agents.
Kyselo’s main concern is that we  need a unifying theory 
of self “as a whole, something that can count as a distinguishable 
unit of explanation and eventually help to interrelate different 
aspects of the self ” (Kyselo, 2014, p.  2), and that can be  used 
to guide work in the cognitive sciences. She argues that the 
social self is “never fully separable from the social environment, 
but instead determined precisely in terms of the types of social 
interactions and relations of which it is, at the same time, a 
part” (Kyselo, 2014, p.  12). Kyselo’s answer to the problem of 
unification distinguishes between two possible answers cognitive 
scientists might give in trying to locate the self. The first is 
the idea that what individuates the self is the living body, 
which she says entails that the social is non-constitutive of 
the self. The second is to individuate the self as a coherent 
unity according to the social dimension. She argues in favor 
of this second option, holding that the social is constitutive 
of the self.
To think of how the social self is determined in social 
interactions, we  can consider the recursivity in participatory 
sense-making, where the autonomous agents both shape and 
are shaped by their social interaction. McGann and De Jaegher 
(2009, p.  433) say of this process that “[c]ulture transforms 
our body from a physical mode of cognition, action, and 
perception to a social one where action can be  shared, values 
coordinated. It is a dramatic alchemy that occurs through 
participatory sense-making and the acknowledgement of the 
agency of another. The implications of this fact for the enactive 
approach cannot be  overstressed.” Thinking about social selves 
and the ethical dimensions of interactions is one way of taking 
up these implications.
However, Maiese (2019) points out that the theory of 
participatory sense-making only goes so far as to say that 
social interactions shape the participants, not determine them. 
Instead, Maiese offers a “life-shaping thesis” of selfhood, in 
which the self is individuated by the body while being shaped 
by the social, to account for the unification of the self over 
time. While Kyselo (2014) claims that the self is individuated 
via social relations, rather than via the body, Maiese (2019, 
p.  364) bases selfhood in the autonomous organization of a 
system, which requires that an organism individuates itself as 
a closed network of systems of self-maintenance. She holds 
that the individuated self “is fully embodied, and that the 
various dimensions of mindedness—that is to say, our desires, 
feelings, emotions, sense perceptions, memories, thoughts, 
intentional actions, etc.—are all partially determined, or shaped, 
by the social world” (also see Scheman, 1983). For humans, 
the intersubjective scale of agency involves individuating oneself 
in the social realm, but this is scaffolded by the ongoing bodily 
processes by which we  are able to maintain our individuation 
over time. So while the self is shaped by the social, this does 
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not root the persistence conditions of the self in the social. 
Rather, the social would be  one domain of embodiment of 
the organismically individuated self, which would enable and 
constrain other dimensions of embodiment.
Maiese’s proposal of the life-shaping thesis (Maiese, 2019) 
provides a robust enactivist notion of the self that does not 
make us choose between the self of cognitive science and the 
social self. The enactive account holds that cognition is constituted 
by a number of nested processes, involving body, brain, and 
world – and for humans and other social organisms, shaped 
intersubjectively. Though Kyselo frames the discussion of the 
self in terms of a context/constitution dichotomy, the project 
of deciding between the social as contextual or constitutive 
of the self is perhaps a bit misguided in terms of metaphysical 
presuppositions. Enactivism, as a non-reductive, process-oriented, 
intersubjective, and multiscale account, can accommodate the 
social as both contextual and constitutive of the self in various 
ways, as Maiese shows. Further, individuation – differentiating 
between self and environment – has been held as one of the 
main characteristics of agency for minimal autopoietic systems 
(Di Paolo, 2005; Barandiaran et  al., 2009). It is not quite clear 
why another sense of individuation would be  necessary. On 
this, Maiese (2019, p.  364, emphasis added) says:
“This distinction between components that constitute 
the living system and elements that form its environment 
grounds not only biological identity, but also the identity 
of the self. Indeed, just as a living system should 
be individuated according to this form or organization, 
the self (or what might described as the human mode 
of life) should be  individuated according to its 
characteristic form or organization, rather than the 
energetic or relational material that ensures its 
continued existence.”
Maiese seems to ground unification in both the individuating 
(physical) and persisting (temporal) sense in the autonomous 
processes of living systems, in line with the autopoietic notions 
of individuation through self-maintenance and self-production. 
The life-shaping thesis holds that the social is not constitutive 
of the self, but that the self is fundamentally embedded in the 
social. The self, she argues, is influenced and shaped by the 
social in the sense that the social has a causal influence, is 
reciprocally shaped by us through our responses or contributions 
to the social, and is normative. It is normative because the 
social shapes our internal norms not only through enabling 
or constraining our embodied processes but also in the 
contributory sense of taking part in participatory sense-making 
and practices that can reinforce, shape, or transform social 
norms. In this way, through social participation and self-shaping, 
social normativity is recursive.
Grounding the self in this way is important for my account 
for two reasons in particular. First, understanding the self as 
fundamentally embodied does not allow for full determination 
of what unifies the self over time in the social. To say this 
is perhaps too dismissive of the first-person authority we  have 
on our own existential identities (Bettcher, 2009) and the way 
these identities shape how we  extend ourselves (through our 
aims, plans, and goals) into the future (Brancazio and Segundo-
Ortin, 2020). Relatedly, it is only because we  can act out of 
accordance with social expectations and demands that we have 
the means for transformative change of the social. Second, 
because it preserves agency and autonomy, the life-shaping 
thesis can be productively integrated with the enactive theories 
of participatory sense-making and direct perception in 
interaction. The self is engaged in social interactions in which 
it can be  shaped or influenced, but it is not fully determined 
within the sphere of these acts, thus fundamentally preserving 
the autonomy of the embodied agent. Maiese (2019, p.  363) 
voices similar concerns about Kyselo’s determination of the 
self in the social and the implications for compatibility with 
participatory sense-making:
“…indeed, participatory sense-making presupposes and 
requires bodily-organismic ‘selves’ who can partake in 
the interaction process. Moreover, for each of these 
‘selves’ to remain an autonomous interactor, it must 
be  possible (even if unlikely) for her to defy social 
expectations, or even disengage from the social 
interaction if she feels so inclined.”
It is also important to note that by being accommodating 
to varying socioculturally situated notions of self, this does 
not necessarily mean that individuals have a self in the narrative 
or reflective sense. In other words, I  believe we  can take 
Maiese’s notion of selfhood as not implying that the social 
self is necessarily unified, or unified in any particular way, 
apart from the embodied sense2. A persistent theme in feminist 
theory and critical race theory is multiplicitous selves and 
identities. Given the numerous communities that one may 
navigate in their social terrain, one may have the experience 
of enacting, adopting, and being treated as more than one 
social self – especially in the case that one belongs to one or 
multiple marginalized groups (e.g., Anzaldúa, 1987; Harris, 
1990; Wing, 1990; Ortega, 2001; Barvosa, 2008). In fact, in 
this work, it is oftentimes embodied persistence through multiple 
social worlds, or the phenomenological mine-ness of experience 
given through embodied persistence and subjectivity, that is 
said to ground individuation or persistence conditions through 
which the agent is able to enact numerous selves in the social 
sphere (Alcoff, 2006). Locating the individuation and persistence 
of selfhood in the “self-organizing” of autonomous systems 
opens up room for an enactive approach to how it is that 
selves can manifest in different ways, depending on particularities 
of context, social roles and cultural knowledge, power dynamics, 
marginalization and oppression, and other aspects that shape 
the way that an agent will take up an interaction.
2 There is quite a bit of literature on narrative selfhood and the distinction 
between minimal and narrative selves, which I  will not be  taking up here. 
Maiese’s account provides a way of having a unified embodied self without 
necessarily making commitments to any specific (or even unified) reflective 
or narrative self (for more discussion on this distinction, see Menary, 2008; 
Mackenzie, 2014, or Zahavi 2007).
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The notion of selfhood proposed by Maiese (2019) captures 
the root of what is important for developing an account of 
how it is that we  directly perceive and selectively respond to 
interpersonal affordances. On her account, the social self is 
an aspect of the embedded embodied self, and the persistence 
conditions of selfhood, while socially embedded, are maintained 
by the embodied processes of organization rather than being 
fully socially determined. The subject directly perceived in 
participatory sense-making is an embodied subject embedded 
in the social. Further, the account makes no general claims 
about what social selfhood is and can be sensitive to the myriad 
ways that sociocultural norms, practices, multiplicity, and 
neurodiversity can influence self-perception and experience.
INTERPERSONAL AFFORDANCES 
BETWEEN AGENTS AND SELVES
I will turn back now to the direct perception of agency and 
selfhood in the social sphere by way of interpersonal affordances. 
As discussed in section “Social Affordances and Interpersonal 
Affordances,” we should take interpersonal affordances to mean 
actual possibilities for interaction with an agent. An interpersonal 
affordance is not perceived in the agent-environment 
relationship, but is afforded by another agent (whether 
intentionally or not). Interpersonal affordances are not 
necessarily already part of an interaction, but they can afford 
an interaction. For example, let us say that I  am  walking 
down the street and I  see a friend, who is engaged in a 
conversation with someone else. I  may perceive them as 
affording a social interaction, though they have not actually 
seen me yet – so there is no intention on their part to 
interact. Conversely, in participatory sense-making, both agents 
are actively affording possibilities for interaction through their 
ongoing utterances, gestures, bodily and emotional coordination, 
and so on. In both cases, the perception of interpersonal 
affordances is not a product of the agent-environment 
relationship, but of the agent-agent relationship, and involves 
seeing the other as a subject.
In section “Social Affordances and Interpersonal Affordances,” 
I explained that interpersonal affordances are directly perceived: 
“The sight of a sad friend affords consoling him or her, a 
colleague at the coffee machine solicits small talk, and an 
extended hand immediately prepares the body for shaking it” 
(Rietveld et  al., 2013, p.  436). It is crucial to note that in this 
example, the perception-as and the action-readiness are 
intertwined, as with the direct perception in the interaction 
theory of social cognition (see De Jaegher et al., 2010; Gallaghehr 
and Varga, 2014). However, the perceiving-as in interaction is 
not perception of a static state. Fiebich (2014, p.  1) makes 
the point that interpersonal affordances are “perceived within 
interactive reciprocal processes,” where the perceived agent is 
engaged in ongoing action processes in response to the behaviors 
of the other in interaction. This is also argued for by McGann 
(2014, p.  26): “There is also no particular moment in time at 
which perceiving is ‘complete’ because such perception always 
occurs in the flow of on-going behavior – activity does not 
have to wait for it.” A continuous interaction offers a continuous 
stream of changing interpersonal affordances – and, recursively, 
engagement with these affordances changes the process 
of interaction.
The participatory sense-making account provided in section 
“Enactive Autonomy and Interaction” makes it clear that these 
reciprocal processes often happen within an autonomous 
interaction, where the interactors are involved in a shared, 
co-regulated (and co-regulating) domain of sense-making. Taking 
this into account, perceiving what is afforded by the other 
agent can also be influenced by the perceiver’s desire to maintain 
the interactive coupling. The perception of relevant interpersonal 
affordances by each individual agent will involve more than 
the concerns of their own self-maintenance – they include 
concerns about the maintenance of the autonomous interaction 
as well. Or, perhaps, the relevance of affordances will instead 
be  influenced by an agent’s desire to leave the interaction (so 
they may begin glancing around the room, looking at their 
phone, or become slow to respond to the interpersonal affordances 
the other agent is offering).
As discussed above, participatory sense-making requires 
seeing another as a subject. In other words, maintenance of 
an autonomous interaction, or agent-agent coupling, already 
presumes agency.
My claim here has been that interpersonal affordances in 
participatory sense-making also involve the direct perception 
of agency and, to some extent, selfhood. This, I  believe, has 
some ethical implications, in line with the ethical dimensions 
of the Gibsonian perspective of affordance perception: “The 
meaning or value of a thing consists of what it affords. What 
a thing is and what it means are not separate, the former 
being physical and the latter mental as we  are accustomed to 
believe” (J. Gibson, 1982, p. 407). If we apply this to interpersonal 
affordances, we can consider how being seen as an autonomous 
agent capable of entering into a participatory sense-making 
process would be  a valuation of our contributions to that 
shared domain of sense-making. Thus, while it does not matter 
to an apple whether it affords edibility to a person, it can 
matter immensely whether a person is viewed as a candidate 
for shared meaning-creation or shaping. The discussion of 
interpersonal affordances thus must involve examining how 
prejudices, power dynamics, biases, and social status influence 
how one is perceived and how this affects their ability to 
contribute to participatory sense-making.
On the farther end of compromises of agency in interaction, 
we can think of objectification. Objectification has many aspects, 
which have been detailed by Nussbaum (1995) and Langton 
(2009). The most important of these aspects for understanding 
the relationship between objectification and interpersonal 
affordance perception is the denial of autonomy, being treated 
as a tool or a means to an end and the treatment of someone 
as interchangeable with objects (or fungibility) (Nussbaum, 1995), 
as well as reduction to body and/or appearance (Langton, 2009). 
Black feminism has long brought attention to the objectification 
and dehumanization that Black women experience, especially 
in terms of animalistic dehumanization and the denial of agency 
(Rollins, 1985; Collins, 1986; Crenshaw, 1991). These kinds of 
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experiences (and others, such as objectification through 
fetishization) have also been discussed in trans theory, most 
predominantly in the experiences of trans persons of color 
(Flores et  al., 2018).
Let us consider a serious case of objectification: street 
harassment (which may include misogynistic, racist, ableist, 
transphobic, classist, or queerphobic harassment, as well as 
many intersecting combinations of these). This kind of harassment 
usually involves a stranger uttering derogatory or sexual words 
of phrases to an individual, though this can also take place 
through (or include) stares, ogling, or physical menacing. In 
describing the psychological effects of the sexual street harassment 
of women, Davis (1994, p.  143) says that it “allows men to 
establish the boundaries of participation in the street. …Through 
street harassment, men inform women that women are public 
participants only with men’s permission.” It is perhaps obvious 
that the individual being harassed is not perceived by the 
perpetrator as affording the kind of treatment that appropriately 
acknowledges their agency and autonomy.
This is neither a social interaction nor an invitation to 
create a shared domain of meaning. Objectification of this 
kind, seems to be  more akin to a “skill” if we  are using the 
Skilled Intentionality Framework (van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017). 
The perpetrator views the harassed person as a relevant affordance, 
not for a social interaction but for objectification 
(dehumanization, denial of agency, being treated as a means 
to an end, and so on). That is, given the above discussions 
about direct perception in ecological and enactive approaches, 
we  can think of the action-readiness tied to the perception 
of a marginalized agent as an opportunity to enact a skill 
(explicitly or implicitly) intended to foreclose the possibility 
of meaningful participation. However, we  should be  cautious 
about going too far in explaining objectification through what 
is exercised by an individual, as this places too much responsibility 
on the individual perpetrator when we  should also be  looking 
at the systemic issues and social structures that allow (or 
encourage) this type of treatment to become habituated.
It may often be appropriate to objectify the local environment 
as affording something for you, within reason and given 
prevailing norms. It is not appropriate to perceive an agent 
as offering something for you  in the same way, if it constitutes 
a devaluation of the person3. But even these are the situated 
claims of a Western anglo philosopher – the environment/
interpersonal distinction, and appropriate attributions of agency 
and autonomy in perception, may be  very different in other 
cultures (Kelly and Lobo, 2020), in which case we  ought to 
look at how affordance perception in those cultures is socially 
shaped (as discussed in section “Social Affordances and 
Interpersonal Affordances”) and be  ready and willing to adjust 
our theories about affordance perception accordingly.
We also need to take into account that, as previously discussed, 
interactions do not just take place between ahistorical agents. 
I have argued that participatory sense-making involves the coupling 
of selves in the interaction process. This means that there is a 
3 This would not apply in cases such as stopping someone on the street to ask 
the time, as this is a request for assistance, not a denial of agency.
recognition not just of an embodied agent in the course of 
interaction, but also a socially embedded agent – an agent that 
has a way (or ways) of being in the world with others that 
pre-exists and continues on after the interaction. I  hold that 
persisting embodied selfhood, as discussed by Maiese (2019), is 
directly perceived rather than reflectively attributed or inferred. 
While this is not the case for every interaction, I  think this is 
an important aspect of participatory sense-making. Seeing the 
participant as an embodied, socially embedded self allows for 
the coordination of expectations about shared meanings that 
structure the interactive space. And in creating a shared domain 
of sense-making, there are opportunities for creating and shaping 
meaning for the social self that extend beyond the interaction itself.
In contrast, one who is denied aspects of their selfhood is 
subject to a compromise in their autonomy in participatory 
sense-making. One way this might manifest is through the 
denial of interpersonal affordances to those belonging to 
non-dominant or oppressed groups. Of course, while street 
harassment is an obvious harm, there are more systemic and 
pervasive ways in which non-dominant groups are not perceived 
as full agents or selves. Speaking on the narrator of Ellison’s 
Invisible Man, Charles Mills discusses the experience of this 
kind of ongoing racialized objectification:
“His problem is his ‘invisibility,’ the fact that whites do 
not see him, take no notice of him, not because of 
physiological deficiency but because of the 
psychological ‘construction of their inner eyes,’ which 
conceptually erases his existence. … So his problem is 
to convince them that he exists, not as a physical object, 
a lower life form, a thing to be instrumentally treated, 
but as a person in the same sense that they are, and 
not as a means to their ends” (Mills, 1998, p. 9; quotes 
from Ellison, 1952).
Another example of a more deliberate denial of selfhood 
would be  engaging in an interaction with a person but 
consistently not using their pronouns. To do so is to perceive 
one as a social self, with an autonomous identity, and then 
purposefully undermine that very sense of self in the process 
of interaction through the interpersonal speech affordances 
offered. Insisting on denying someone’s selfhood in interaction 
in this and other ways denies full entry into participatory 
sense-making, as it is a forced regulation of autonomy. This 
kind of harm, as a denial of selfhood and agential identity 
(Barnes, 2019; Dembroff and Saint-Croix, 2019), limits an 
agent’s ability to participate in the co-creation of meaning 
(De Jaegher et al., 2016) in a social interaction, among causing 
or perpetuating other harms.
In closing this section, I  believe it is important to note 
that looking at the experiences of those who have their agency 
and selfhood actively denied suggests that we ought to be very 
careful about what we  can take for granted in enactive and 
ecological approaches to social interactions and affordance 
perception. While there is clearly more to discuss in regards 
to the perception and denial of agency and selfhood, my 
intention has been to demonstrate that the direct perception 
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of interpersonal affordances involves the perception of agency. 
I have also argued that in many forms of interaction, including 
participatory sense-making, direct perception will also involve 
seeing the other as a self. To not appropriately perceive these 
in some cases can constitute serious harms to a person. Using 
the enactive theory of participatory sense-making, I  have also 
shown that this can limit one’s ability to enter into processes 
of meaning creation or shaping.
CONCLUSION
As enactivism and ecological-enactivism progress in explaining 
complex human realms of being, they grow increasingly concerned 
with social normativity and social institutions. For example, De 
Jaegher (2013b) has looked at how patriarchal and democratic 
institutions can be  understood through the enactive approach to 
intersubjectivity. Maiese and Hanna (2019) have offered concrete 
suggestions for transforming our political and social institutions 
using insights from enactivism and ecological psychology. And 
Rietveld et  al. (2017) have brought attention to the important 
challenge of adapting insights from enactive and embodied cognition 
into resources for increasing social cohesion and inclusivity.
I have argued that recognition of selfhood and maintaining 
a distinction between environmental affordances and interpersonal 
affordances are important for these projects. On one hand, 
this is explanatorily important due to the different kinds of 
coupling involved. On the other hand, this distinction is important 
for theorizing about the ethical and political aspects of affordances. 
To say that perception of affordances is the same, whether 
environmental or social, generalizes away from the concrete 
realities of experience and selfhood in interaction.
If we  are looking for ways to increase social cohesion 
“understood as the co-existence of disparities, not the elimination 
of particular backgrounds” (Rietveld et  al., 2017, p.  303), as 
Rietveld et  al. have discussed, we  first need to understand the 
concrete particularities of bringing people together in social 
spaces. In bringing together ecological and enactive approaches 
to evaluating the ways in which our social institutions and 
practices can be  transformed, we  must also actively build 
resources for examining and understanding how our habits 
and actions contribute to devaluation and other harms to other 
agents. And by being attentive to the ways in which marginalization 
and oppression structure social interactions, we  can better 
examine the ethical aspects of our research on interactions, as 
well as practicing more ethical interactions ourselves.
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